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Peru at the Brink of Economic Collapse:




• Since 1988 Peru has plunged into a deep economic crisis which has already caused
severe social strife and threatens to uproot the young democratic system. The present
government seems to be unable to arrest the precipitous decline of per capita income of
the Peruvian population. Therefore, the result of the next presidential elections in early
1990 will hinge on the credibility of the candidates' economic reform programmes.
9 The Peruvian economy is suffering from large government deficits, a declining interna-
tional competitiveness, an outdated and underutilised capital stock, and substantial arre-
ars on the high debt burden. These structural deficiencies have resulted in an economic
quandary which is characterized by hyperinflation, a drain of foreign exchange reserves,
a dramatic decline of output, and mass unemployment.
• The economic plight of Peru can largely be attributed to a long history of policy failures.
Adverse external developments such as low commodity prices or high interest rates were
of minor importance. A comprehensive and consistent policy reform programme accom-
panied by foreign financial support would go a long way in bringing Peru back to a sus-
tained and socially acceptable growth path.
• Priority areas for policy reform are to stop hyperinflation by public expenditure cuts and
a tax reform, to improve domestic resource mobilisation by dismantling financial sector
regulations, and to regain international competitiveness by exchange rate adjustment
and lower import protection.
• Successful adjustment of the Peruvian economy will require an internationally-agreed
temporary suspension of debt service payments and a supply of fresh funds to finance
restructuring. Domestically, social hardship caused by adjustment has to be eased by
targeted food subsidies to the poor.
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While Peru is preparing for the presidential elections in mid-1990, it faces the
second economic crisis within six years. In 1988, real gross domestic product
(GDP) fell by 9 percent, outstanding external debt amounted to US$ 16.3 billion
(Table 1) and the economy was on the road to hyperinflation; in June 1989, the
annualised inflation rate reached 5835 per cent. The economic recession has im-
poverished the Peruvian people and a substantial part of the population is already
starving. Per capita income in real terms has declined by roughly 15 per cent
since 1980. Furthermore, declining real incomes and increasing unemployment have
caused social unrest and have prepared the ground for the growing terrorism. In
view of this situation, the survival of Peru's democratic system heavily depends on
whether the presidential candidates can offer a credible strategy to overcome the
mounting crisis. For designing future policy reforms a critical assessment of
current problems is necessary. It is the aim of this paper to provide such an
analysis. The basic hypothesis is that the economic malaise in Peru can not be
attributed to adverse international developments, such as low commodity prices or
high interest rates, but rather results from a long history of policy failures.
In order to derive useful policy conclusions the following analysis starts from
the most pressing problems. In Chapter II, an overview of economic development in
the 1980s is followed by an evaluation of the inflationary process. Subsequently,
possible measures to improve Peru's domestic resource mobilisation are discussed.
Chapter III contains an analysis of the external account. The causes of the per-
sistent trade deficit are investigated and alternative strategies for the external
debt problem are evaluated. Chapter IV deals with sectoral issues. An attempt is
made to confirm the hypothesis that government policies hinder the functioning of
the labour market and discriminate against the agricultural sector. The final
chapter summarises the main findings and provides an agenda for medium and
long-term policy reforms required to reactivate economic and social development in
Peru.
This is a revised version of a paper written for a seminar on economic policy in
Lima, Peru, 29-31 May 1989. Financial support from the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung
and helpful comments by Ulrich Hiemenz are gratefully acknowledged.Table 1 - Main Economic Indicators for Peru, 1980-88
Basic economic indicators













































































































































Source: CEPAL [var. iss.; unpubl. data].II. Domestic Developments
1. Performance and Policy Background
Peru covers an area of 1.23 million square kilometres and its population was
estimated to be 21.3 million in 1988. In comparison, the Federal Republic of Ger-
many has only one fifth of Peru's size but roughly three times as many people.
Nevertheless, in 1985, 68 per cent of all Peruvians lived in urban areas while the
average urbanisation ratio for all middle-income developing countries was only 48
per cent. The strong annual population growth rate of 2.3 per cent was, however,
not matched by a similar performance of GDP. In 1988, GDP per capita was
roughly 1000 US-dollars, about 86 per cent of what it had been in 1980 (Table 1).
The decline resulted from two deep economic recessions in 1983 and 1988, in which
GDP dropped by 11.7 and 9.0 per cent, respectively. Between both recessions,
economic performance had recovered and due to a consumption boom GDP expanded
by 8.9 and 7.3 per cent in 1986 and 1987.
The fluctuations in the performance of the Peruvian economy reflect erratic
changes and inconsistencies in macro-economic policy. The first democratically
elected government under President Belaunde started its five-year term in 1980,
partially reversing the previous import substitution strategy. Some trade barriers
were removed and the financial sector was liberalised, although incompletely. Since
the currency was overvalued, exports stagnated while imports soared. At the same
time, efforts to control the public sector deficit proved to be unsuccessful as
infrastructure investments and arms purchases abroad were increased. The re-
source gap was financed by foreign capital inflows and government borrowing from
the Central Bank. Increasing rates of inflation and crowding out of private
borrowers were the consequences.
Following the 1983 recession, the Belaunde government undertook efforts to
reactivate the economy. Imports were restricted again and the exchange rate was
actively devalued. Public finance improved since taxes and tariffs of state en-
terprises were adjusted upwards and foreign debt service payments were partially
suspended. While these measures corrected the external and internal imbalances,
economic growth remained low and the inflation rate could not be brought down. In
According to the definition of the World Bank.this situation the APRA government with President Alan Garcia took up its re-
sponsibilities in July 1985. It applied the so-called heterodox model to reactivate
the Peruvian economy. Real wage increases to expand domestic demand were
coupled with reductions in indirect taxes and real interest rates to encourage the
business sector. Balance of payments problems were thought to be solved by intro-
ducing a multiple exchange rate system and limiting debt service payments to 10
per cent of Peru's exports. These measures were complemented by a temporary
price and exchange rate freeze. While this set of policies stimulated economic
growth in the short run, it also led to severe imbalances: the public sector deficit
widened intensifying inflationary pressures and the current account deteriorated.
By the end of 1987, the situation had become unsustainable so that the government
allowed drastic price increases and devaluations. Subsidies were curtailed and ex-
change rates unified. However, the policy changes could not prevent Peru from
running into a deep economic recession. The starting hyperinflation and the
scarcity of domestic resources seriously narrowed growth prospects. Therefore,
the causes of the inflationary process and issues in domestic resource mobilisation
deserve special attention.
2. The Inflation Trap
Rates of inflation as high as in Peru are a major obstacle to a stable economic
development. They affect economic growth negatively in several ways. Empirical
evidence documents that high rates of inflation are unstable [cf. Logue, Willet,
1976; Blejer, 1979; Corsepius, 1988]. The volatility of inflation rates, however,
causes uncertainty for holders of financial and real assets:
- In the absence of a fully indexed financial sector unstable inflation rates
increase the uncertainty with respect to the real return of financial assets.
Hence, saving in real assets such as precious metals and durable consumer goods
is favoured. Financial intermediation is reduced and domestic resource mobil-
isation weakened. This weighs heavily in highly indebted developing countries
since they have to finance their growth mostly internally.
- Volatile inflation rates lower real capital formation as investors will only realise
highly profitable short-term projects. As regards investments with long pay-off
periods, firms will demand a substantial risk premium which makes these projects
Alianza Popular Re volucionar ia Americana.unprofitable. Empirical evidence for Peru confirms the negative relationship
between real capital formation and inflation rates even for inflation rates sub-
stantially below those in 1987-88 [Corsepius, 1988].
Other negative effects of high inflation rates include a redistribution of
wealth in favour of borrowers and the rich who tend to have better opportunities
to hedge against inflation losses than the poor. Furthermore, in developing coun-
tries the real tax revenue of the government is inversely related to the inflation
rate due to time lags in tax collection (Tanzi-Oliviera effect).
Peru's record inflation rate of 1988 is not an unprecedented inflationary
attack but rather the preliminary peak of a long inflation experience. Consecutive
policy failures intensified the inflationary process so that Peru now faces hyper-
inflation. When the Belaunde government came into office in 1980 the annual
inflation rate was already 61 per cent (Table 1). According to this government the
inflation was of demand pull origin [EIU, 1988]. The main reasons were thought to
be the monetisation of reserves having been accumulated in the commodity boom
1979-80 and the fiscal deficit. Consequently, subsidies were curtailed and a
half-hearted import liberalisation implemented. The latter was intended to reduce
prices by increasing competitive pressure. In addition, a restrictive monetary
policy was followed to reduce demand further.
However, the government failed to realise that the way of financing its deficit
is more important than its absolute size. Thus, inflation may result from deficit
financing by Central Bank credit which increases the money supply. In the case of
Peru, the deficit financing by the inflation tax led even to increasing rates of in-
flation as it was clearly incompatible with the growing dollarisation of the economy:
the existence of financial assets denominated in US-dollar with yields superior to
those in national currency induced savers to shift into dollar assets. In 1984,
deposits in foreign currency accounted already for 50 per cent of broad money
(M2) (Table 2). This reduced the quantity of money the government could tax
through seignorage. For a given deficit more inflationary finance and more rapid
inflation was necessary. This in turn raised the rate of devaluation required to
maintain the real exchange rate, increasing the expected return of dollar assets in
national currency. The subsequent shift into dollar assets reinitialised the entire
process [Hanson, Neal, 1985].
In addition to the policy inconsistencies, the public sector deficit did not
shrink as envisaged and when Peru was hit by adverse wheather conditions in
1983, the inflation rate reached 125 per cent. Thereafter, the upward adjustments
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Source: BCRP [1985]; CEPAL [var. iss.; unpubl. data]; own calculations.
improved the external account and lowered the public sector deficit but resulted in
an annualised inflation rate of almost 200 per cent in mid-1985.
The new APRA government of Alan Garcia took a different view of the infla-
tionary process and attributed it to cost-push factors. The government changed
several times its strategy to fight inflation. Initially, in the period July 1985 to
December 1986 most prices in the Peruvian economy were frozen: the two bench-
mark exchange rates after the July devaluation, domestic prices and tariffs of
state enterprises, and all industrial products and most services. In addition,
saving and lending interest rates were lowered to one third of their early 1985
level and then maintained till the end of 1986 (Table 3). The convertibility of
foreign currency deposits was suspended to stop the dollarisation of the financial
sector. These measures were complemented by a restrictive monetary policy.
Because of high reserve requirements for commercial banks broad money grew con-
siderably less than the monetary base.
The functioning of the price freezes relied mainly on the credibility of the
incoming government and the voluntary adherence of the people to the limits,
since at least initially the government was even lacking the administrative
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36.5 34.4 46.5 253.3
73.5 53.1 86.0 225.4
121.5 101.3 132.0 301.0




















. 1985 the Central Bank publishes effective
is charged for credits up to one year. - (c) In-
of capitalisation. - (d) Annualised rates, based on monthly ceil-
Daily capitalisation yields foi
or more: 901.8 per cent.
• 90-180 days: 735.6 per cent; for 720 days
Source: BCRP [var. iss.; unpubl. data]; CEPAL [unpubl. data].
The results of this strategy were economic reactivation and disinflation. In
1986, the annual inflation rate dropped to 63 per cent after 158 per cent in 1985
and real GDP expanded by 9 per cent. The GDP growth was mainly a consumption
boom; firms used idle capacity while investment in plant and equipment remained
sluggish. Actually, GDP grew mostly in the second half of 1986 when monetary and
fiscal policies had become expansionary. Adverse effects on the inflationary
process remained small as Garcia inherited a relatively balanced public sector
budget and a high level of international reserves.
In 1987 and 1988, however, the inflationary financing of the public sector
deficit fuelled inflation which was suppressed temporarily. In 1987, the government
persued a more flexible price strategy and most prices as well as the multiple10
exchange rate system were periodically adjusted. At the same time the level of
government expenditures was kept constant while current revenue declined due to
tax cuts and an erosion of the tax base (Table Al). The Central Bank provided
inflationary finance for the widening public deficit. Furthermore, the Banco
Central de Reserva del Peru expanded the money supply to cover its exchange and
interest rate subsidies. The inflationary process was further fuelled by real wage
increases, so that the annual inflation rate reached 115 per cent. Finally, in the
first eight months of 1988 the government tried to stop the economic decline by a
series of ad-hoc measures: periodic price increases at first, a 120-day price freeze
later on, tax increases and expenditure cuts. However, the measures were neither
taken in a co-ordinated fashion nor were the deficit reduction and the price
increases sufficient to correct the underlying imbalances. Thus, in September the
government abolished price controls and devalued the inti substantially. This
resulted in a monthly inflation rate of 119 per cent in September alone, bringing
Peru to the beginning of hyperinflation. In addition, the measures could not
prevent Peru from running into a deep recession: real GDP contracted by 9 per
cent.
In view of the negative effects of high inflation rates and the critical situ-
ation in Peru a stabilisation of the inflationary process is absolutely essential for
economic recovery. As the Peruvian experience reveals, this implies to reduce the
public sector's financing needs drastically and/or switch to non-inflationary
financing of the deficit. The former calls for revenue raising measures and ex-
penditure cuts, while the latter requires an improvement in the domestic resource
mobilisation as new foreign funds are not available. These issues are discussed in
the next chapter. Nevertheless, further measures are necessary to reduce inflation
rates in Peru. In particular, widespread backward-looking indexation of wages
needs to be modified in order to avoid current inflation rates from being auto-
matically translated into future inflation rates.
3. Domestic Resource Mobilisation
Any analysis of domestic resource mobilisation in Peru needs to focus on two
different issues. Firstly, it has to be evaluated whether the financial sector
The Central Bank payed commercial banks a higher interest rate on reserves
than it charged the government on debt.11
efficiently mobilises savings and finances those investments, which are most
productive from an economic perspective. Secondly, domestic resource mobilisation
can be improved if public expenditures are brought into line with public revenue,
thereby reducing the deficit which is to be financed by the Central Bank.
a. The Financial Sector
Although a strong causal relationship between economic growth and financial
development is difficult to prove empirically, there is a strong theoretical
reasoning that differences in economic growth can be attributed to the size,
structure, and development of the financial sector in the countries in question.
According to the concept of financial deepening [Shaw, 1973] an expansion of the
financial sector can reduce the transaction costs within the economy by equating
maturities of savings with those of credits, by exploiting economies of scale in
gathering information and by risk diversification. However, in order to achieve
these benefits of financial intermediation, financial institutions have to act as
efficient intermediaries. The performance of financial intermediaries can be
evaluated from three perspectives. Firstly, financial intermediaries must offer in-
struments to savers which satisfy the various needs of depositors with respect to
risk, return and maturity. Secondly, efficient intermediation requires that financial
institutions provide funds for those investments which are most profitable for both
the banks and from an economic perspective. Thirdly, the resources involved in
the process of intermediation between savers and investors have to be minimised.
Since financial institutions in developing countries mainly rely on savings and
time deposits in providing long-term credits, the ratio of quasimoney to GDP is
used to assess financial deepening in Peru. Judging from this indicator, Peru's
financial sector expanded markedly between 1980 and 1984: the ratio of quasi-
money to GDP grew from 16.7 to 24.8 per cent (Table 2). The growth of foreign
currency deposits was particularly strong, their share in total quasimoney rose
from 46 to 64 per cent in the 1980-84 period. Nevertheless, these figures over-
represent the development of Peru's financial sector. Effective reserve require-
ments for foreign currency deposits were at average 60 per cent and thus much
higher than for deposits in national currency. The shift in favour of dollar
For a discussion of this issue, see Fischer [1982, pp. 9-14; 117-124] and the
literature cited therein.12
deposits increased the loanable funds with which banks could finance investments
by much less than the growth in quasimoney seemed to indicate.
Under Garcia, the financial sector contracted significantly. In 1987, the
dollarisation was reduced to 20 per cent and the ratio of quasimoney to GDP
dropped to 10 per cent. In 1988, a further disintermediation could only be avoided
because foreign currency deposits jumped up again.
These developments may be explained by variations in the Peruvian interest
rate policy. Both governments used ceilings to regulate nominal interest rates.
These allowed real ex-post returns on deposits in national currency only to be
negative. In the Belaunde period, however, foreign currency deposits with positive
attractive real yields were available to hedge against inflation losses. The Garcia
government suspended the convertibility of foreign currency deposits and held the
exchange rate constant. Consequently, foreign currency deposits lost their attrac-
tion. Instead, savers hoarded dollars outside the financial sector since the changes
2
in the black market exchange rate compensated them for the inflation losses.
Hoarded dollars are, however, not available for investment finance so that financial
disintermediation took place. Only in 1988, the exchange rate was more frequently
devalued so that the return to foreign currency deposits increased again (Table
A2).
Judging from the other two performance criteria, intermediation costs and
efficient allocation, the Peruvian financial sector also faces major problems.
Efficient intermediation involves minimising transaction costs in transferring funds
from depositors to borrowers. This implies that operating costs are kept low and
profits in the banking industry do not exceed levels in competitive situations.
According to available data for the 1978-80 period, Peruvian banks were relatively
inefficient from a macro-economic perspective (Table 4). Operating costs and
profits were much higher than in industrialised countries or South Korea, Malaysia
and Thailand. Furthermore, figures for 1985 indicate that the performance became
worse as compared to the early eighties. While the oligopolistic structure of the
banking industry may have contributed to costly intermediation in Peru, the tem-
porary nationalisation of the banking industry under Garcia could not solve the
problem either. The extensive branch systems of banks, overstaffing and non-
The positive relationship between the level of interest rates and the volume of
financial savings is well-documented empirically. For an overview, see Corsepius,
Fischer [1987].
2
Significant amounts of US-dollars are available in Peru because of illegal drug
exports which are estimated to be worth some 1 billion US-dollars.des Insfifuts fur Weitwirtschaft
13
Table 4 - Indicators for the Costs of Financial Intermediation in Selected Industrial
and Developing Countries, 1978-80 (percentage share of total assets)
Colombia(c)
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(f) Deposits instead of assets used. -
n.a. = not available.
(c) Domestic
- (e) Commercial banks. -
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Source: Rezende Rocha [1986]; Superintendencia de Banca y Seguros [var. iss. ];
own calculations.
price competition of banks which are subject to interest rate controls are major
impediments to efficient intermediation.
As concerns the allocation of the mobilised funds indirect evidence points to
severe bottlenecks. The existence of a flourishing informal financial sector in-
dicates credit rationing in the formal financial sector. Obviously, many firms do
not have access to subsidised credits from commercial banks and have to pay
higher rates in the informal sector. These differences in borrowing costs can
cause inefficiencies as less productive firms may crowd out more productive ones
because of lower interest rate payments. In addition, credit restrictions were im-
posed in 1987. Accordingly, banks have to relend certain shares of their deposits
to the region where they raised them. Furthermore, depending on the type of
bank a varying share of the funds has to be lent to agriculture. The restrictions
limit the flow of mobilised savings to the most productive investment opportunities.
Interest rates are much higher in the informal than in the formal financial
sector. For an overview, see Thome et al. [1988].14
In view of the importance of an efficient financial sector for economic de-
velopment a major reform of the financial sector in Peru is warranted. While lift-
ing interest rate ceilings and reducing inflation rates are necessary measures to
improve the efficiency, they do not suffice. In particular, credit restrictions have
to be abolished and the integration of the informal and formal financial sector has
to be fostered. At the same time, the supervisory authorities are to be strength-
ened to ensure solid bank management and competitive behaviour in the industry.
b. Public Finance
The inflationary financing of the public sector deficit has been identified as
main determinant of the inflation process in Peru. A detailed analysis of the
Peruvian public sector is beyond the scope of this paper. However, some salient
features indicating the major problems on the revenue and expenditure side can be
presented:
- While current expenditures of the non-financial public sector declined from 51 to
40 per cent of GDP in the 1980-87 period (10 per cent in 1988), the real ex-
penses for remunerations remained relatively stable around 11 per cent of GDP
(Table 5). Hence, in 1987, wages and salaries already accounted for 31 per cent
of current expenditures.
- In the second half of the eighties, Central Bank losses due to subsidisation of
exchange and interest rates became a major source of the monetary expansion.
- In the late eighties, the policies of low prices and tariffs of public enterprises
eroded their income. In spite of reduced capital expenditures their financing
needs grew (Table 5).
- Tax cuts and Garcia's policies towards foreign trade led to a significant
reduction in tax revenue. The ratio of the revenues of the central government to
GDP fell from 21 per cent in 1980 to 7 per cent in 1988 (Table Al).
- In comparison to other developing countries the level of tax revenues in Peru is
very low. Especially, revenues from income and foreign trade taxes are below
average (Table 6).
Reducing the wage bill could lower current public expenditures significantly
in Peru. This implies reversing Garcia's high-wage policy to speed up consump-
tion. A wage freeze may be a first step. Nevertheless, in order to achieve a sub-
stantial reduction in expenditures a structural reform of government pay and em-
Cf. Corsepius [ 1989] for a detailed analysis of the Peruvian capital market and
possible reforms.15












































































































Source: BCRP [var. iss.; unpubl. data].
Table 6 - Tax Revenues in Peru and Other Selected Developing Countries (per-
centage of GDP)
Income taxes
Wealth and property taxes
















an average per capita income of US$ 1195.
Source: Table Al; Tanzi [ 1987].
ployment policies is necessary, which also considers the possibility of cutting the
work force in the public sector. The argument that high wages in the public
sector are necessary to support the poor is not valid. The recent Peru Living16
Standard Survey shows that the poor are mostly self-employed and do not profit
from wage increases in the public sector [Glewwe, 1987]. The need for inflationary
finance will also be reduced if multiple exchange rates are unified and adjusted.
Subsidies being provided through preferential exchange rates would disappear and
automatically lower the monetary expansion of the Central Bank.
With respect to public sector revenues a comprehensive tax reform seems most
promising. The current system of unco-ordinated taxes and selective exemptions
has to be simplified. This would be more in line with the administrative capacity of
the tax office, so that coverage and collection could be improved. In particular, a
reform of income taxes provides scope for raising revenues. However, as long as
the huge informal sector cannot be integrated into the formal economy, revenue
gains from the tax reform will remain insufficient to finance development expendi-
tures. Finally, upward adjustments of the prices and tariffs of public enterprises
could diminish financing requirements and increase efficiency. Charging less than
marginal cost may lead to excess demand and the need for additional finance. An
efficient allocation of resources cannot be assured. The scope for raising prices
and tariffs of public sector enterprises in Peru is substantial. In 1988, real prices
for public goods and services accounted on average only for 40 per cent of their
1985 levels, due to price freezes and selective adjustments implemented by the
APRA government.
III. The External Sector
The development of the external accounts of Peru is a major source of concern.
Peru has experienced a deterioration of the balance of payments in the last three
years which points to the necessity of structural reforms for economic reactivation:
- In 1988, the trade balance showed a substantial deficit for the third consecutive
year (Table 1).
- External debt obligations increased to US$ 16. 3 billion or 613 per cent of exports
and arrears had amounted to US$ 9. 4 billion.
- The Central Bank ran out of international reserves.
In order to formulate policies to overcome the crisis, major problems with
respect to international trade and foreign finance are analysed next in separate
sections.
According to de Soto [1987], the informal sector accounted for 39 per cent of
the GDP as registered in the national accounts.17
1. International Trade
In the 1980s, changes in Peru's trade balance have not revealed a stable
development but rather a sequence of ups and downs. Due to high prices of its
traditional exports such as minerals and petroleum in 1980, exports exceeded im-
ports by US$ 661 million (Table 1). However, in 1981, when prices and volume of
exports declined while imports continued to expand (Table 7) the trade balance
turned into deficit. It remained negative in spite of increasing exports in 1982.
Only in 1983, when imports fell more than exports a small trade surplus was
achieved. Similarly in 1984 and 1985, the trade surplus resulted mainly from the
contraction of imports. Finally, in 1986, the situation was reversed again as im-
ports started to expand vigorously.
The reasons for these fluctuations and the poor performance of exports can
mostly be found in Peruvian trade policies. To a lesser extent, international price
changes and domestic production difficulties are relevant too. Among the policies
affecting Peruvian trade, exchange rate management figures prominently. Since
Peru experienced inflation rates well above those of its major trading partners in
the 1980-88 period, devaluations were necessary to keep the real effective ex-
change rate constant. During most of the years the government devalued the sol
(since 1985 the inti), though not sufficiently, thus causing a real appreciation of
its currency (Table 7). Hence, Peruvian exports became more expensive for
foreign buyers while foreign goods could be imported cheaper. The devaluations of
1985 brought only a temporary correction of the real exchange rate. As a result of
Garcia's policy to freeze nominal exchange rates, the real exchange rate appre-
ciated again in 1986 to levels similar to those in 1982/83.
More recently, in late 1986, the introduction of multiple exchange rates
further distorted international trade (Table A2). In order to reform the economy
according to national priorities and to lower the price of important imports,
traditional exports were given a less favourable exchange rate than manufactured
exports and priority imports. Consequently, important exporting activities were
discouraged and imports soared. Besides, multiple exchange rates distorted the
domestic price system by implicit subsidies and penalties. Inefficient resource
allocation was likely to result. Furthermore, inconsistencies between tariffs, ex-
change rates and export incentives were difficult to avoid. Thus, production and
export decisions were negatively affected by differing price signals.
The exchange rate management influenced international trade also by increas-
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repeatedly and in an unforseeable manner, the future path of the real exchange
rate was difficult to project. Unstable exchange rates did not induce firms to
enlarge their capacity for exports, since uncertain export revenues and import
prices increase the risk of unprofitable investments. Paredes [1987] confirmed
empirically the negative influences of real appreciations and exchange rate un-
certainty on Peruvian manufactured exports.
In sum, improvements in Peru's trade performance require reforms which
stabilise and unify the exchange rates at a competitive level. However, exchange
rate management cannot fully explain the shifts in the trade balance. The use of
quantitative restrictions and tariff policy was also decisive. Changes in the
structure and level of both import restrictions followed a similar time path. The
Belaunde government initially pursued a trade liberalisation course, continuing the
reductions in tariffs and quantitative restrictions which had been started under
the last military government (Table 8). In late 1983, this policy was turned
around, as import restrictions were used to improve the deteriorating trade
balance. Garcia intensified the protectionist measures. In 1987, the average tariff
reached 67 per cent with a maximum rate of 123 per cent. As concerns the tariff
structure, it is noteworthy that the highest rates were applied to manufacturing
and the lowest to agricultural products. Within the manufacturing sector consumer
products received much more protection than intermediate imports. In addition, the
number of items whose import was prohibited was raised from 8 (1985) to 535 in
1987. All other items required import licenses, whereas in July 1985, 4757 items
could still be imported freely.
Severe efficiency losses have emerged from Peru's extensive use of import
restrictions and their combined effect with multiple exchange rates. The first set
of problems stems from the inefficient administration of protective measures while
the second is due to the effects of protection on production decisions. Granting
protection through quantitative restrictions is more costly than using tariffs ex-
clusively. The government foregoes the tariff revenue if licenses are not auctioned
off but just given away to importers. Furthermore, the bureaucratic costs of ad-
ministering quantitative restrictions is much higher than in the case of tariffs. The
arbitrary distribution of import licenses cannot assure that the most efficient
importers receive licenses and changing approval procedures create uncertainty for
importers. However, in Peru the administration of tariffs causes also problems.
The customs office is not capable of controlling tariffs tightly and exonerations are
widespread. Consequently, within the same category different importers may be20
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confronted with different rates. In addition, information costs rise as the existence
of exonerations further complicates the already wide dispersion of tariff rates.
More important than administrative problems are efficiency losses which result
from production decisions being based on distorted price signals. The combined
effect of overvalued exchange rates and import protection supports import sub-
stitution at the expense of exports. The production of consumer goods for the
Peruvian market is favoured since competition from imports is restricted. Further-
more, protection raises selling prices in the domestic market while expensive im-
ports and unfavourable exchange rates lower the profitability of exporting activi-
ties. Thus, it does not surprise that the manufacturing sector has specialised in
consumption goods, and intermediate inputs with low protection still have to be
imported. The distorted pattern of production incentives and lacking integration in
the world economy have caused considerable welfare losses for Peru. Furthermore,
its low level of exports and its dependency on imports makes Peru particularly21
susceptible for external shocks which increase import prices. As export revenues
currently cannot compensate higher import expenditures, foreign reserves become a
binding constraint. In the absence of fresh foreign funds, a crisis is likely to
emerge when foreign exchange reserves are exhausted, because domestic pro-
duction will drop due to the lack of essential imports.
This situation seems to call for external liberalisation and improvement in
Peru's international competitiveness. However, up to now Peru opted for
strengthening its export subsidy schemes instead. Currently, CERTEX and FENT
are most important. Under CERTEX exporters receive a tax-free certificate which
can be used to pay taxes. Its value depends on the type of export product and
may amount to as much as 25 per cent of the fob value. FENT is a promotional
credit line which supplies credits at rates below those prevailing in the market. In
1987, the difference in rates was about 17.5 percentage points. Despite the sub-
stantial amounts being extended through the subsidy schemes, CERTEX and FENT
cannot correct the policy-induced distortions in the economy. First of all, these
measures only offset the anti-export bias for exporters. The distortions affecting
the domestic market remain. In addition, both subsidies are costly to administer
and put a strain on the Treasury and the Central Bank. Increasing subsidies thus
conflicts with the aim to control public financing requirements and to fight in-
flation. Finally, the schemes cause additional inefficiencies as some exports are
subsidised unnecessarily while the subsidies are too small to promote other
products effectively.
Summing up, the review of Peru's trade performance underscores the neces-
sity of lowering protection by abolishing quantitative restrictions and reducing
tariffs. Subsidies cannot serve as a substitute for liberalisation and can be cut
back as liberalisation proceeds. This lowers also the danger of further retaliation
which an increased use of CERTEX and FENT is likely to provoke.
2. External Debt
Peru's high and increasing external debt obligations are another major prob-
lem any economic reform has to deal with. In 1988, total foreign debt outstanding
Certificado de Reintegro Tributario a la Exportaci6n No Traditional.
2
Fondo de Promoci6n de Exportaciones No Tradicionales.22
amounted to US$ 16.3 billion (Table 9). About 90 per cent were medium and long-
term commitments of which 84 per cent accrued to the public sector. On the
creditor side, international organisations, such as the World Bank, and commercial
banks figure most prominently, each group accounting for some US$ 3. 5 billion.
While Peru shares this type of debt burden with other Latin American count-
ries with debt service problems, Peru's situation is unique due to its accumulation
of arrears. In 1984, the Belaunde government suspended partly interest and
amortisation payments to avoid a deepening of the recession. This policy was
further aggravated by Garcia who announced in his inaugural speech that debt
service payments were limited to 10 per cent of Peru's export value. As a conse-
quence, Peru has been declared ineligible by the IMF.
It is not advisable for Peru to continue with its confrontation with foreign
creditors since this strategy entails significant costs. Although future economic
growth will have to be financed mostly domestically, the necessary structural re-
forms in the trade regime and the domestic capital market require initially foreign
funds, too. Otherwise adjustment costs are difficult to cushion and strong
resistance against the reforms is to be expected. However, fresh money will not be
available as long as no agreement on current obligations is reached. Therefore,
Peru has to enter into negotiations with its creditors. Any solution has to take
into account that Peru's ability to service its foreign debt will remain rather
limited over the next couple of years. Nevertheless, if Peru commits itself in a
credible way to future payments, significant reductions in its debt service burden
should be possible. As the secondary market value of Peruvian debt is below 10
per cent of its face value [Cohen, 1988], creditors currently do not seem to ex-
pect significant service payments. Peru's commitment to future service payments
may thus increase the willingness of foreign creditors to make new money avail-
able. This applies to multinational organisations in the first place. The use of the
credits for a well-defined adjustment programme would increase Peru's ability to
service its debt and thus raise the expected return to the debt already outstand-
ing.
One year later, this policy was modified and excluded payments in kind and
payments to Latin American countries and entities [Kisic, 1988].23
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IV. Sectoral Issues
Within the Peruvian economy three sectors merit special attention: agriculture,
mining, and the labour market. Since in 1986 50 per cent of the work force were
estimated to be underemployed and the work force is growing at rates above 3 per
cent, a functioning labour market is of vital importance. The mining sector
traditionally generated a large part of Peru's export earnings. Its reactivation
could lower the stress on the balance of payments. As concerns agriculture the
production record has been far from being satisfactory. Peru is still dependent on
food imports. In addition, the poorest part of the population lives on agriculture
so that improvements in productivity are socially desirable, too.
1. Labour Market Rigidity and the Informal Sector
The success of trade reforms is contingent on whether market participants
can adjust to the new incentive structure. Some production activities being
oriented to the domestic market mainly will become unprofitable and have to be
closed down. On the other hand, new opportunities for exports emerge and require
new investments. A necessary precondition for structural changes is that capital
and labour markets are flexible and allow for shifts of workers and savings. There
are, however, clear indications that the Peruvian labour market and its economic
legislation lack the necessary flexibility.
The existence of the huge informal sector supports this view. De Soto [ 1987]
estimated that 48 per cent of the work force are employed in the informal sector
producing 39 per cent of measured GDP. Besides manifold bureaucratic procedures
which increase the costs of setting up formal businesses, several government poli-
cies, in fact, work out as barriers of entry into the formal labour market. As most
Peruvians cannot afford to remain unemployed, they are forced into self-employ-
2
ment in the informal sector. Particularly under Garcia's administration, negative
real interest rates and high real wages limited the number of possible jobs in the
formal sector because firms preferred capital-intensive rather than labour-intensive
De Soto's estimates are questioned by other researchers on econometric grounds.
They conclude that the size of the informal sector should be significantly lower
[Rossini, Thomas, 1987].
2
For data on the informal sector in Metropolitan Lima, see Carbonetto [1987].25
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projects. After real wages had dropped to 50 per cent of the 1980 level in July
1985, the government achieved dramatic increases by decreeing national minimums
and avoiding inflationary erosion with quarterly adjustments (Table 10). Labour in
the formal sector was further discriminated against capital since, by legislation,
fringe benefits in the order of 25 per cent of the basic wage were required.
Initially, the flexibility of the formal labour market was also reduced by the
Labour Stability Law. Accordingly, firms are not allowed to fire workers unless
those are convicted of having committed crimes. In addition, employees which
leave the company voluntarily are to be paid one month's salary for every year
employed in addition to accumulated vacation pay. Since the costs of dismissing
employees grow rapidly, firms may be unable to adjust to changing market condi-
tions by reducing their work force. Consequently, firms are reluctant to fill up
their vacancies and the transfer of workers from declining firms to booming ones is
hampered. In addition, firms had to employ at least 90 per cent of their employees
This applies to workers having passed the three-months probation period only.26
on a permanent basis. Since July 1986, the negative effects of the restrictive
legislation have been mitigated by the employment programme PROEM. The latter
allows firms to appoint temporarily an unlimited number of employees for a period
up to two years.
The deficiencies of the formal labour market cannot be compensated by self-
employment in the informal sector. Firstly, the existence of the informal sector
does not provide flexibility for firms operating in the formal sector. Since most
larger, firms being involved in international trade operate in the formal sector, the
flexibility for a trade liberalisation is still missing. Secondly, informality entails
significant costs for both individual workers and the economy as a whole. Incomes
in the informal sector are generally low, since firms operate with low productivity.
Due to credit rationing and scarce know-how the businesses are often confined to
commerce and services. More importantly, informality implies that contracts are
difficult to enforce as the basic legal certainty granted by the state does not
apply. Furthermore, as the informal sector avoids taxation payments, public
finances are weakened. At the same time, macro-economic management, such as the
control of the money supply, is complicated because little statistical information
exists on informal transactions.
Summing up, the Peruvian labour market does not provide the mobility of
workers being required by major structural reforms. While the informal sector
mitigates the negative effects of bureaucratic regulations and lacking jobs in the
formal sector, it cannot serve as a substitute for an efficient formal labour market.
Instead of promoting informal activities, reforms should rather aim at eliminating
the causes of the informal sector. This involves greater flexibility in the labour
legislation and a correction of the bias in favour of capital-intensive projects.
2. Mining
The mining sector which traditionally generated 40 per cent of Peru's export
revenues performed particularly poor. Its contribution to GDP dropped from 10 per
cent in 1980 to 7.8 per cent in 1988 (Table A3). Peru is well equipped with
mineral resources. Besides producing lead and zinc, the country ranked as the
seventh largest world copper producer in 1987 and was among the world's three
major producers of silver. In addition, considerable unexploited copper reserves
are known. Hence, the contraction of the sector does not result from exhausted
reserves.27
Similarly, the sluggish performance cannot be blamed only on low world
mineral prices, since in 1988 the price of Peru's major export product, copper,
exceeded the 1980 price (Table A5). The reasons are rather the heavy taxation of
exports and production difficulties due to labour disputes. When Garcia introduced
multiple exchange rates, minerals were given a less favourable exchange rate than
other exports (Table A2). Thus, in the first quarter of 1987, the difference in
exchange rates between traditional and priority exports was 28 per cent. Labour
disputes in the mining sector affected domestic production severely because the
strong unions took care that many workers participated in strikes. Mainly in the
last quarter of 1988, strikes brought production practically to a standstill.
Consequently, the sum of man-hours lost due to labour disputes was three times
larger in the mining than in the manufacturing sector, though the latter employed
about five times as many people (Table A6).
3. Agriculture
Agriculture is still an important sector in the Peruvian economy, contributing
on average 14 per cent to GDP (Table A3). Furthermore, in 1987, 36 per cent of
the work force were still employed in agriculture. The performance of the sector
has, however, been far from being satisfactory and has enhanced the migration
into urban areas. Production expanded slowly over the last 17 years; the increase
in production is mainly due to the expansion in the cultivated area (Table 11).
Particularly food production could not keep pace with population growth. Even
heavy food imports which turned the agricultural trade balance into deficit did not
raise the food supply: in 1987, the daily per capita supply of calories was below
its 1961 level and below the average of all low middle-income developing countries.
In addition, it is not likely that larger food imports would benefit the poor. In
1985, two fifths of the poorest 30 per cent were self-employed peasants [Glewwe,
1987]. They lack the financial means of buying imported food. Instead, improve-
ments in nutrition require real income growth in agriculture.28













































































































































Source: FAO [a; b]; CEPAL [unpubl. data].
Agricultural policy as well as the import substitution strategy have been major
hindrances to agricultural expansion. Traditionally, Peruvian governments have
controlled consumer prices for agricultural products to keep them low. In the
period 1981-85 for example, wholesale prices for agricultural products of national
origin grew much less than wholesale prices for domestically produced manufactures
(Table A4). Price responsive farmers were discouraged and production was low.29
Garcia maintained the policy of low consumer prices for food products but changed
the measures. Consumers received heavy subsidies for certain domestically-
produced food products and imports were subsidised with favourable exchange
rates, since they were classified as priority imports (Table A2). Furthermore,
guaranteed producer prices were introduced. In addition, production costs were
kept low, due to subsidised credits and fertiliser. As a result of these policies
production boomed in 1986/87. Nevertheless, output expansion could only be
achieved at the expense of huge transfers from the Treasury and the Central
Bank. The policy mix became unsustainable in late 1988, so that prices were freed
and the inti devalued. Consequently, the subsidisation of agriculture disappeared.
Peruvian policies also discriminated agricultural exports against imports and
manufactured products. In the 1981-85 period, nominal rates of protection for food
products such as maize and wheat exceeded protection rates for export products
like coffee and cotton by 85 percentage points [Herrmann, 1989]. Hence, agri-
cultural export products were more exposed to competing imports. More important
were, however, indirect effects due to an overvalued currency and an import
substitution strategy. The overvaluation of the exchange rate at which agricultural
products had to be exported raised the price for foreign buyers and made
Peruvian exports less competitive. Furthermore, Herrmann confirmed empirically
that import protection measures which raised wages and import prices lowered agri-
cultural exports. Consequently, agricultural production for exports declined while
2
imports grew and the agricultural trade deficit widened (Table 11).
All in all, policies towards agriculture were costly and contradictory. The
Peruvian experience shows that farmers respond to price signals and that the
change of relative prices according to national priorities may become very
expensive. Policy reforms should aim at reducing the bias against export products
and try to bring national prices in line with world market prices. This could
assure an efficient allocation within the agricultural sector and avoid costly
subsidies. At the same time, imports would be reduced and exports promoted.
However, as far as consumer prices are raised for basic agricultural goods,
compensatory measures are necessary to soften the effects on the poor. Never-
theless, well-targeted subsidies would be more effective and less costly than an
unspecified subsidisation through overvalued exchange rates and price controls.
The price system is administered by two public enterprises, ECASA for rice and
ENCI for wheat as well as other food.
2
Only in 1985, the drastic devaluation depressed imports temporarily so that the
agricultural trade balance showed a small surplus.30
V. Agenda for Medium and Long-Term Policy Reforms
A short-term stabilisation programme and long-term structural reforms are
required to reactivate the Peruvian economy. Contrary to traditional policy-making
in Peru, a few ad-hoc measures to stabilise the economy will not suffice. However,
in view of Peru's development potential a rapid economic recovery is most likely
once the necessary policy changes are implemented. Peru is well-endowed with
natural resources, notably minerals which could provide an important source of
export revenues. A largely underemployed but well-educated labour force is
available. In addition, the potential for domestic food production has not been fully
realised so far.
A comprehensive and coherent policy reform is necessary to exploit Peru's
development potential. Experience from other countries shows that correcting macro
policies is of pivotal importance in this respect. Stopping inflation contributes more
to economic reactivation than simplifying bureaucratic procedures. Therefore,
successful overall reforms have to focus on abolishing distortions at the macro-
economic level in the first place. In the context of this paper only the general
policy guidelines can be outlined. The implementation of the reforms has to take
into account the existing network of political relationships and pressure groups.
Lowering inflation has been identified as major prerequisite for sustained
economic growth. Some authors [Stein, 1980] have emphasised gradualism in this
respect to avoid a major decline of production and employment due to contraction-
ary monetary policy. In the case of Peru, a gradual approach to eliminate inflation
is not warranted for several reasons. Firstly, monetary fine-tuning is impossible
when the economy has already run into hyperinflation. Secondly, small reductions
in the public sector deficit do not necessarily translate into small reductions in
inflation. Kiguel [ 1986] has shown that hyper inflationary pressures can mostly be
stopped only if public sector financing requirements are drastically curtailed.
Thirdly, the success of any disinflationary policy depends heavily on its
credibility. Otherwise, the public will not adjust prices and wages to keep the
recessionary impact of the stabilisation policy small. In a country with a long in-
flation experience such as Peru, drastic measures bound to achieve improvements
promptly are more likely to produce the necessary confidence. The example of the
successful stabilisation in Germany after 1923 is a case in point [Sargent, 1982].
For a careful analysis of the political economy of a trade liberalisation, see
Amelung [1988].31
As the inflationary financing of the public sector deficit has been identified
as major cause of the inflation spiral in Peru, expenditure cuts and revenue
raising measures are required. Food subsidies and remunerations are obvious can-
didates for savings. However, food subsidies should not be abolished altogether.
Reforms should aim at targeting subsidies at the poor only. Furthermore, transfers
to public enterprises can be lowered, where prices and tariffs of public enter-
prises are brought into line with marginal costs. In the long run, the privatisation
of some public enterprises must be considered also. This could be combined with
debt-equity swaps as the Chilean experience shows. Revenues could be increased
with a comprehensive tax reform, which unifies existing taxes and improves
receipts from income taxation, but foreign budgetary support may be needed
during a transition period.
A reform of the domestic capital market can help to finance remaining public
sector deficits in a non-inflationary manner. Lifting interest rate ceilings and
credit controls enable financial institutions to offer savers attractive saving
instruments. Measures which increase the competition among banks will prevent
them from increasing intermediation costs above competitive levels. One such
measure is the opening of the capital account so that foreign banks can compete
with domestic ones.
However, a substantial body of literature [Edwards, 1984; Frenkel, 1983] has
argued that capital flows should only be liberalised after free trade has been
introduced. Accordingly, asset markets adjust more quickly than goods markets to
new policy regimes. Capital inflows following the capital market liberalisation would
push up the real exchange rate to levels which impede the structural transition of
the real sector. In fact, exchange rate movements have created distortions in
previous liberalisation attempts. Nevertheless, it can be shown that these were due
to inconsistent policies rather than the sequence of liberalisation [Donges,
Hiemenz, 1985; Sjaastad, 1984]. Mismanagement of nominal exchange rates
particularly, has caused major problems.
In view of these experiences and Peruvian exchange rate policies possible
distortions from "false" exchange rates are to be avoided. Therefore, the exchange
rate should be allowed to float freely. This implies that the trade and the capital
2
account are to be liberalised simultaneously. Specifically, quantitative restrictions
The liberalisation programmes in the Southern Cone countries - Argentina, Chile,
Uruguay - are often-cited examples.
2
As the African experience shows, the technical prerequisites for free floating are
often overestimated [Mussa, 1987].32
should be abolished while tariffs are unified and reduced. Since many Peruvians
are well aware of their disastrous economic situation, the necessity of major
structural reforms is known. Hence, a shock treatment trying to achieve an overall
liberalisation of the economy will be even more credible than in previous years. In
addition, recent developments in agriculture and the informal sector have demon-
strated that Peruvians adjust quickly to changing price signals. This suggests that
economic reactivation will take less time than in other countries.
A stabilisation programme along the aforementioned lines will reactivate the
Peruvian economy and especially speed up the development of those sectors which
have been discriminated hitherto. Notably, minerals will become important exports.
Labour-intensive projects can be expected to provide additional jobs and agricul-
tural production, particularly export crops, will increase. The positive effects on
economic growth can be supported by complementary reforms in the labour market
and the public bureaucracy. To increase flexibility in the labour market, the
temporary employment programme PROEM should be extended and the costs of the
Labour Stability Law cut back. In addition, simplifying public authorisation
procedures can help to integrate the formal and the informal sector.
Nevertheless, these reforms may not provide sufficient employment and an
income distribution which is socially acceptable. Additional measures can be con-
sidered. Landownership in Peru is extremely skewed [Glewwe, 1987]: only 10 per
cent of the population own 86.3 per cent of the land. Furthermore, starting in
1980, the restructuring of co-operatives has resulted in an organisational crisis. A
land reform accompanied by measures normalizing land tenure may help to improve
the living conditions of the poor. In the long run, public investment in education
of the poor is also likely to have an equalising effect on welfare in Peru. It can be
shown that education and income are highly correlated [ ibid., 1987].
However, the prevailing analyses do not allow a final judgement on the costs
and benefits of a land reform and other complementary measures. Further investi-
gations are required for designing these strategic policies.Statistical Appendix
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Table A2 - Exchange Rate Structure for Trade Transactions, 1986-88 (a)
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the quotation of foreign currency certificates since August 1987.
Source: BCRP [var. iss. ]; CEPAL [unpubl. data].
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